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OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION
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Most post-war studies of Japanese policies in Southeast Asia 
during World War II are colored by the "moralistic" biases of their 
authors, which include apologists as well as critics.1 But in fact 
many of the situations and events for which criticism is levelled 
at the Japanese occupying forces arise not from anything specifical­
ly Japanese but from the general nature of a military government of 
occupation in wartime: whether that government is established by a 
"fascist" nation, as in the case of Japan, or a "democratic" one, 
as in the case of the United States.2 Military governments of 
occupation generally tend toward absolutism, and their rulers, 
backed by overwhelming force, often display an air of superiority 
and arrogance toward their subjects. Aid to combat units engaged 
in prosecuting the war becomes the supreme concern, while the civil 
rights of the civilian population are neglected. Utilization of 
the pre-existing forms of government in the occupied areas is pre­
ferred to imposing political and social changes, but often military 
governors find themselves facing barriers of cultural and linguistic 
difference which separate them from the governed. How much success 
the governors have in overcoming these barriers depends to a large 
extent on the personal character and training of the key adminis­
trative personnel. And however successful a military government 
may be in this regard, it is bound to invite resentment and hatred 
from the governed sooner or later.
Due consideration has been paid to the interaction between the 
Japanese military government and the Indonesian population, but 
previous studies have largely ignored the interaction within the 
Japanese occupying forces themselves.3 As a result "The Japanese"
1. I regard Muhamed Abdul Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955) as an example of moralistic 
criticism and Shigetada Nishijima et. al. , Indoneshia ni okeru 
Nihon gunsei no kenkyu [A Study of the Japanese military govern­
ment in Indonesia] (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten, 1959) as apologetics.
2. See: John F. Embree, "American military government," in Meyer
Fortes, ed. , Social Structure: Studies presented to A. R.
Radcliffe-Brown (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949*) .
3. Notable exceptions are Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Some
Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 
1944-45 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961) and 
"Japan: The Light of Asia," in Josef Silverstein, ed. ,
Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven:
Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1966).
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2have remained a monolithic and faceless entity. The point of this 
essay is to demonstrate that this monolithic entity was in fact 
composed of individuals and that, in spite of the overall bakayaroj 
authoritarian orientation, the Japanese military government was not 
run by troops of robots mechanically carrying out policies decided 
upon in Tokyo. Generally speaking, Tokyo decided only basic policies, 
which were then elaborated at the several intermediary decision­
making levels: Saigon, later Singapore (Southern Regional Armies'
Headquarters) and Djakarta (16th Army Headquarters) in the case of 
the Army occupied areas, or Makassar (Naval Civil Government Head­
quarters) and Surabaja (2nd Southern Fleet Headquarters) in the case 
of the Navy.
Moreover, those administrative personnel who were in direct con­
tact with the local population had ample room for determining how and 
what parts of the given policies to implement. Actual execution of 
the policies was dependent not only on the organizational structures 
but also on personality factors in the field administration. The 
character and background of the individual military governors are thus 
crucial to an analysis of the administrative situation.
The experiences of the Japanese involved in the military govern­
ment of Indonesia were unusual and exciting and had deep effects.
Many have written personal memoirs and accounts since the war. Some 
of these have been published,1 but many remain in manuscript form or 
in private circulation.5 These memoirs provide rich information 
about how the Japanese personnel of the military administration were 
"prepared" for their duties, how they adjusted themselves to the 
situation, what they thought of their own policies, and how they 
evaluated the Occupation itself. Most of the accounts, especially 
those from the immediate post-war period, are written in an informal 
and personal style with little consideration for private or national 
interests; this makes them more useful than the information collected 
from post-war Allied trials, the major source for many authors deal­
ing with the Occupation period. The interrogation documents tend to 
demonstrate what the Allied personnel wanted to know from the 
Japanese rather than what the Japanese involved thought important. 
Prefacing a compilation of English translations of Japanese documents 
on the military administration of Indonesia, Benda has complained: 
"Missing in their entirety [from the translations] are reports from 
field administrators . . . reporting on the policies decreed from head­
quarters . . . and for that matter on popular reactions to the 
military authorities."6 This gap is filled, to some extent, by the 
personal memoirs.7
4. Most recent publications include Keiji Machida, Tatakau Bunka-butai 
[Fighting Culture-Corps] (Tokyo: Hara-shobo, 19673 and Munenari 
Yanagawa, Rikugun Chohoin Yanagawa-chui [Army Intelligence Officer 
1st Lt. Yanagawa] (Tokyo: Sankei-Shimbun Shuppan-kyoku, 1967).
5. For example, the memoirs of Maj. General Moichiro Yamamoto, a later 
16th army commander, still remain private.
6. Harry J. Benda et al., eds. , Japanese Military Administration in
Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University, South­
east Asia Studies, 1965) , p . v.
7. For some field reports written in the Occupation period, see:
Mitsuo Nakamura, "Checklist of Microfilm Holdings on the Japanese 
Occupation of Indonesia in the Cornell University Library (Wason
3War Policies in General
Japan's war policy for Southeast Asia had to meet two contra­
dictory requirements. On the one hand Japan had to emphasize the 
cause of the "liberation of Asian peoples" in order to justify its 
operations in alien territories and to gain the support of their 
nationalist elements for the war effort. Less often noticed is 
the fact that this justification of the war was also necessary to 
secure the cooperation of the Japanese people with their own 
government. This campaign for the "liberation of Asia" succeeded 
in overcomifig domestic suspicions about the prolonged war with 
China and a reluctance to fight against the technologically superior 
Allies. The ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
developed into an indispensable tool for inspiring the Japanese 
population to fight and endure wartime difficulties.* 8 The vast 
majority of the Japanese people accepted this ideology.
On the other hand, the execution of war plans required that 
Southeast Asia fulfill particular roles. Japan needed the area's 
natural resources and manpower, without which the continuation of 
the hemispheric war was impossible; this meant the exploitation of 
the area's people. The contradiction between "liberation theory 
and colonial practice" haunted the Japanese throughout the war in 
Southeast Asia, and top policy planners as well as field adminis­
trators were well aware of it.
This contradiction and the necessity for political maneuvering 
were most keenly felt in Indonesia, especially in Java. In other 
areas under the Japanese occupation, the framework within which 
Japan dealt with the local political forces was largely predeter­
mined. To secure the cooperation of the ruling oligarchy in the 
Philippines, Japan promised them an early independence. In Indo­
china, diplomatic relations with the Vichy Government limited the 
range for maneuver despite commitments to the nationalist movement. 
In Burma, a promise of independence proved necessary to help 
stabilize the internal political situation and to topple the old 
colonial order of British India. The Japanese Army's commitment 
to the independence cause reached the level of blood-brotherhood 
between some Japanese officers and local nationalist leaders and 
could not be betrayed. In the case of Thailand, friendly diplomat­
ic relations, outwardly at least, prevented interference in inter­
nal politics except for the early days of the invasion and during 
the final moments before defeat. On the Malay Peninsula, Chinese 
guerrillas had to be crushed; conservative sultans were easily 
attracted to cooperation with Japan.9 Admittedly, the above
Collection)" (Ithaca: mimeo, 1970).
8. For specific cases of changes in attitude, after the declaration
of war in the Pacific,by liberal-to-left intellectuals who had 
been critical of the war with China, see: Yoshio Iwamoto, "The
Relationship between Literature and Politics in Japan, 1931-45," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1964).
9. Takushiro Hattori, Daitoa-senso Zen-shi [History of the War 
for Greater East Asia) (Tokyo: Masu.-shobo, 1953), I, p. 317.
4characterizations are rough and very general, but it is my contention 
that the amount of room for political maneuvering is a useful 
variable for determining the common and diverse features of the 
Occupation in the various countries of Southeast Asia.
In Indonesia, the framework was relatively flexible, for Japan 
had made no official commitment to the nationalist movement before 
the war. Individual contacts and semi-official connections certainly 
existed, but in contrast to the cases of Burma and Indochina, there 
was no "Indonesian lobby" in any official circles, including the Army 
General Staff Headquarters (Sambo Hombu).
This office had started collecting military information on the 
Dutch East Indies in 1939. At the same time and probably in co­
ordination with the military, the Asian Economic Research Bureau 
of the Southern Manchuria Railroad Company, one of the best staffed 
semi-government research agencies in pre-war Japan, began publishing 
a journal entitled Shin-Ajia {New Asia). It covered contemporary 
politics, economics and culture in Southeast and Southwest Asia and 
was under the general editorship of Shumei Okawa, a renowned Pan- 
Asianist scholar and politician. Many research and survey articles 
on the Indonesian nationalist movement appeared in this journal prior 
to the war. Both these efforts, however, remained on the "intel­
ligence" and "intellectual" levels.
There was also a group of Japanese journalists (Tatsuji Kubo, 
Tatsuo Ichiki, Tomegoro Yoshizumi and several others) who had 
maintained close contacts with Indonesian nationalist circles before 
the war, but they were either removed to Australia or relegated to 
obscurity after hostilities began. Those detained in Australia 
were later repatriated in the exchanges of civilians between Japan 
and the Allies, or else returned home by other routes. Almost all 
of them eventually participated in the occupation administration of 
Indonesia. But apparently none of them had been involved at the 
top levels in pre-war policy-making for the Dutch East Indies. They 
had operated as private individuals and served at most an intelli­
gence function.1®
Among the military, apparently only Army Lt. Col. (later Colonel) 
Yasuto Nakayama had some first-hand knowledge of pre-war Indonesia.
He had served in Batavia from 1940 to 1941 as the military attach^ 
to the Japanese consulate, but his contact with the Indonesians had 
been severely restricted by ever-increasing Dutch surveillance. For 
whatever reason, he took no significant political action. Navy 10
10. It has been contended that the detention in Australia of pre-war 
Japanese residents of the East Indies, combined with the losses 
suffered by the Japanese invading fleet in the Battle of the Java 
Sea,created a substantial lack of "Indonesian experts" among the 
early occupation forces. (See: Harry J. Benda, "The Beginnings of 
the Japanese Occupation of Java," Far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (August 
1956), pp. 541-560, esp. p. 543.) Post-war Japanese sources do 
not substantiate this belief. Many of the Japanese detained in 
Australia, including the corps of journalists mentioned above, 
were repatriated. (Machida, Tatakau, pp. 151-152.) The torpedoing 
of the Japanese ships inflicted very few casualties among the 
civilian group accompanying the 16th Army; a reporter from the 
the Mainichi-Shimbun was killed. (Ibid. , p. 55.)
5Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Tadashi Maeda also served as a military 
attache in Batavia in the 'thirties. But there is no evidence to 
suggest that he played a role in the policy-planning and decision­
making of the central military offices prior to the war. There 
were, in short, no "political officers" in top military and govern­
ment circles in Tokyo who were personally and organizationally com­
mitted to Indonesians was the case for other Asian nations. In 
preparing occupation policies, Tokyo policy-makers worked without 
being well informed about the power or trustworthiness of Indonesian 
nationalist leaders, the efficiency and loyalty of the civil ser­
vice, or the political usefulness of the Islamic leaders. Partly 
as a result of this ignorance, but mostly because of the Army's 
preoccupation with the crucial role of Indonesia as a base camp 
and supply center for the Southeast Asian theater, the future 
political status of Indonesia was never clearly defined, except 
for the tacit agreement which existed among those concerned that 
the "Greater Indonesia movement should be curbed as much as possible." 
Only in the last stage of the war in Southeast Asia did this change.
Because of these uncertainities, those Japanese who ran the 
military government of Indonesia faced an enormous task of learn­
ing, analyzing, and interpreting information about Indonesia on 
the spot before using it for planning and implementing policies.
It was a matter of trial and error. The organization of Indonesian 
leaders and masses into the Three-A, Poetera, and Java Hokokai move­
ments, the creation of Boei-giyugun (peta) , and special emphases 
placed on the youth and Moslems all display the experimental nature 
of the administrators' approach.
Administrative Organization on Java
The basic assumptions of Japanese occupation policy were 
articulated in a document entitled the "Principles Governing the 
Administration of Occupied Southern Areas" which was adopted at 
the Liaison Conference between the government and the Imperial 
General Headquarters (Daihonei) on November 20, 1941; it became 
the official policy binding in both the Army and Navy territories. 
The Army and Navy then adopted more specific policy documents for 
the administration of territories under their respective jurisdic­
tions .
In each regional unit of military administration in both the 
Army and Navy territories, the respective regional headquarters 
drew up and adopted even more specific policy documents for the 
military administration in that particular area. All these policy 
documents invariably emphasized three main goals: first, restora­
tion and maintenance of peace and order; second, securing vital 
war resources; and third, self-sufficiency of combat troops in the 
respective areas.1 2
11. Sambo-Hombu [Army General Staff Headquarters], "Daitoa minzoku
shido yoko" [Principles for the guidance of the peoples in 
Greater East Asia], August 6, 1942, contained in: Wason Film
905, reel no. 1, Cornell University Library.
12. For English translations of some of these, see: Benda et^  al. ,
Selected Documents.
6The first requirement for the new government, that of maintain­
ing peace and order, proved relatively easy and was not a major concern 
for the military government of Java. Already in the early days of 
the war, a legend about Japan's almost supernatural supremacy had been 
created and impressed upon local people by the quick and total sub­
jugation of the Allies in Indonesia, and elsewhere. Few Indonesians 
dared to defy the Japanese authorities nor were any subversive activ­
ities attempted. In spite of their notoriety, the Kempeitai (Military 
Police) were only active in arresting people in the chaotic days dur­
ing the early period of the Occupation and in the last several months 
of general disintegration. Their main function consisted of collec­
ting intelligence information from among the people and conveying it 
to the top administrative circle. Judicial and police activities 
increased only after petty robbery, corruption, and blackmarketeering 
became prevalent, coincident with the deterioration of the economy and 
the strict regulations imposed on economic activities in the latter 
half of the Occupation. Small scale revolts occurred in Tasikmalaja, 
Tjeribon and Blitar, but though alarmed, Japanese authorities did 
not retaliate indiscriminately on the Indonesian population as a 
whole.
The troops of the 16th Army, the main force concerned with peace 
and order and the one in direct contact with the Indonesian popula­
tion, had not been recruited with any consideration for their fitness 
for, or previous experience in, Indonesia. However, there was vir­
tually no turn-over among the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 
and during the more than three years they were stationed in Java 
they became fairly familiar with the Indonesian environment and its 
people. Miyamoto, a staff member in charge of military operations 
of the 16th Army, thinks that this was one of the reasons why many 
of the Japanese troops would not comply with post-war Allied orders 
to use fire-arms against the Indonesians.13 In striking contrast, 
the commissioned officers were changed almost annually, according to 
the promotion system of the military hierarchy. No single military 
officer known to us remained in the same position throughout the 
forty months of the Occupation, making it more difficult for officers 
to accumulate experience. The military and civil police corps also 
seem to have possessed no significant contingents of Indonesian 
experts. The higher positions in the civil judicial offices were 
manned by a few score attorneys and assistant-attorneys from the 
equivalent judicial offices of Japan. There were no experts on Dutch 
law or adat among them. Few official documents or personal accounts 
of judicial corps activities have survived, apparently the result of 
efforts to destroy evidence before the Allied war criminal trials.14
13. Shizuo Miyamoto, Jawa shusen shori-ki [Records of the cessation 
of hostilities on Java] (mimeo, [195S?]), contained in Wason 
Film 905, reel no. 2, pp. 37, 48 and 66.
14. Two exceptions which have come to my attention are: "Osamu
Military Operation Order No. 854," [Order of the 16th Army con­
cerning the incorporation of the command of the Military Police] 
(September 22, 1942) in Wason Film 905, reel no. 2 and "Report on 
the Military Administration Police" [Explanatory Material] 
(September 1942) in Wason Film 905, reel no. 2. For brief annota­
tions to the two items, see my Checklist items no. 139 and 147.
7The main concerns of the military administration were in the 
fields of exploitation and persuasion. The specific tasks associ­
ated with exploitation changed over time according to the vicissi­
tudes of the war. At first, in 1942, when Japan had enough ships 
and naval forces, the administrator’s primary duty was to meet 
Tokyo's demands for supplies. From 1943 to 1944 exploitation 
policies had shifted to the pursuit of self-sufficiency for the 
armed forces in the South. From 1944 to 1945, after Java had begun 
to prepare for its own self-defense, the administration worked for 
regional autarchy and local stockpiles of war supplies. Throughout 
these stages, the emphasis was on exact statistics and material 
objects, not on people. Human beings came into consideration 
only when it became necessary to determine how much they could pro­
duce or how little they could consume. Major Miyamoto, who later 
took charge of the Logistics Section of the Staff of the 16th Army, 
stated that, as basic information for planning, "[I] had only to 
know how much exploitation the native population could endure."15 
Otherwise, the reaction of the Indonesian population was outside 
the concern of the administration; it had only to execute its 
duties in a businesslike and rational manner.
Personnel in charge of exploitation activities came from two 
groups. Middle-level officials of the Imperial Government who 
held the ranks of section and subsection chiefs in Ministries such 
as Finance, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture, Postal Services, 
and Railroads were transferred to the corresponding offices in 
Indonesia without relinquishing their status in the Imperial civil 
service. Businessmen and engineers from the major private companies 
of Japan, who had the skills and knowledge necessary to run economic 
enterprises, also served the occupation regime.16
In contrast to the exploitation activities, the task of per­
suasion was closely involved with human concerns. Here the admin­
istrator had to persuade or to dissuade, in short, to "win the 
hearts of the people"--a vague task at best. The vagueness resulted 
partly from the fact that Tokyo made no explicit decision on the 
political status of Indonesia until the last year of occupation. 
Until then, the task was defined vaguely as "cultivating among the 
native population the consciousness of belonging to Greater Japan 
and the ability for self-rule" and inducing "a sense of trust in 
Imperial forces."17 Beyond this, no definite general guidelines 
seem to have been sent out from Tokyo, except for the proscription 
of a small category of tabooed subjects. For instance, the slogan 
"independence for Indonesia" was not to be used since the "pre­
mature encouragement of native independence movements shall be
15. Miyamoto, Jawa shusen, p. 3.
16. Very little is known about the activities of this element of 
the administrative personnel in spite of the fact that they 
were directly responsible for the material quality of Indonesian 
life. One of the reasons why they have kept silence about 
their experience during the Occupation must be that many of 
them have continued an active role in economic relations between 
Japan and Indonesia.
17. Sambo-Hombu, "Daitoa minzoku," and Benda et al., Selected 
Documents, p. 2.
8avoided."18 The achievements of the propaganda activities are very- 
difficult to measure. Success in a goal might be gauged by the num­
ber of people who could be rallied under a particular slogan, and by 
the number of resolutions supporting that slogan, but there is no way 
to measure the intensity of the people's support. The task required 
not so much rationality as emotion, not so much planning as imagina­
tion. The personnel also had to persuade themselves of the correct­
ness or necessity of a particular propaganda line before being able 
to persuade.others, and further, they were the most sensitive and 
vulnerable among the administrative personnel to popular reactions 
against the military authorities. The result of these conflicting 
pressures was often cynicism and despair.
Tfrose engaged in propaganda displayed the widest variety of 
backgrounds in the military administration. They included newspaper 
reporters and editors (mainly from Asahi Shimbun), writers, novelists, 
poets, essayists, musicians, painters, radio announcers, film-pro­
ducers, and a contingent of teachers from various academic levels.
They had been conscripted by the military to participate in the admin­
istration. The conscription of civilian intellectuals was widely 
used to force their cooperation with the military and in this regard 
liberals and ex-leftists were more often conscripted than were those 
openly sympathetic. In addition to the actual utilization of their 
intellectual abilities for military purposes, the practice was 
apparently intended both as a loyalty test and as a form of brain­
washing for sceptics.19 Although some of them worked to propagandize 
the Japanese community in Indonesia, most of them came into direct 
contact with the Indonesian population. A few of them had a previous 
knowledge of the Indonesian language, but many had learned it after 
arrival in Java.20
The size of this group indicates how much the military expected 
of it. The Sendenhan (Propaganda Corps) which accompanied the land­
ing of the 16th Army in March of 1942 already had eleven officers, 
about one hundred soldiers, and eighty-seven conscripted intellectuals, 
the last group being by far the largest among the similar corps at­
tached to the occupation forces anywhere in the South.21 Some of 
them returned to Japan, being released from duty after one year, but 
many volunteered to remain longer and also more recruits arrived.
Their activities, in many senses unique in the performance of 
psychological warfare, left a deep impression on the minds of the 
Indonesian people. All the more deeply affected by the contact with 
the Indonesian population were the intellectuals themselves. Al­
though part of the Japanese military government, they were not en­
tirely locked up in it. They often played, because of their own 
ideals and aspirations, a role distinct from the official lines of
18. Benda et ajL. , Selected Documents, p. 2.
19. Hidetoshi Kuroda, Gunsei [Military Government] (Tokyo: Gakufu- 
shoin, 1952), pp. 73-76.
20. For example, Hitoshi Shimizu started learning "Malay" on the boat 
to Java. Machida, Tatakau, p. 65.
21. Masaaki Tanaka, Hikari mata kaeru--Ajia dokuritsu hiwa [The Light 
returns--Secret story of the independence of Asia] (Tokyo: Nihon- 
shuho-sha, 1958), p. 75. Also, Machida, Tatakau, passim.
9the military administration. Many of those Japanese who later 
fought for the Indonesian Republic against the returning Dutch came 
from this group.
Finally, but not less importantly, there was a small but dis­
tinct administrative unit on top of the functional groups. It 
could be called a staff corps, in the sense that the "staff" is 
distinguished from the "lines" It represented the power and 
authority of the 16th Army to the public, planned over-all policies, 
supervised policy implementation, and coordinated the different 
sections of the administration. The personnel of the staff corps 
were divided into three different units. One was a section of the 
Headquarters of the 16th Army (the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief- 
of-Staff, the Vice Chief-of-Staff, and a member of the Staff 
responsible for the military administration); another was composed 
of civilian officials in the General Affairs Department of the 
Java Military Administration. In actual practice these two units 
merged into a single body because the Army Chief-of-Staff was also 
the Superintendent-General of Military Administration, and a 
member of his military staff was Head of the General Affairs Depart­
ment. In terms of recruitment, the formal distinction was impor­
tant, for the military personnel changed periodically while the 
civilian officials remained the same.
The third unit of the staff corps were the advisors to the 
military administration, senior bureaucrats and established 
politicians appointed directly by the home government. In addi­
tion to its advisory function, this unit served as an alternative 
to the military chain of command as a channel of information 
between the central offices in Tokyo and the 16th Army.
General Imamura's Experience in Java
During the twelve months from November 1941 to November 1942, 
(Lt.) General Imamura served as the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th 
Army, the man responsible for forming the structure of the military 
government and for decisions on basic policy toward civilians.
His personal memoirs, originally written in 1948, give us a fair 
amount of information about this early period of the Occupation.22
22. There are three editions of the memoirs written by Imamura: 
the original manuscript, its English translation, and a later 
Japanese publication. In May of 1948, Imamura was transferred 
from an Australian jail in Rabaul to a Dutch jail in Batavia 
(Djakarta). While he was there awaiting trial by the Dutch, he 
started to write an autobiography in diary form. The jail 
authorities gave him official encouragement to do so and had a 
Japanese interpreter (Masatsugu Morita) translate the manuscript 
into English. The translation was then typewritten in several 
copies and circulated among the Dutch court and jail personnel. 
This English translation, which is entitled A Tapir in Prison, 
is now to be found in the Indische Collectie at the 
Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (Amsterdam). The 
original manuscript and a copy of its English translation were 
later returned to Imamura himself. He then reworked it and 
published it under the title, Imamura Hitoshi Taisho Kaikoroku 
[Memoirs of General Hitoshi Imamuraj (Tokyo: Jiyu Ajia-sha,
1960) , 4 vols.
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His memoirs are also among the most detailed autobiographical accounts 
ever written by a member of the military elite of pre-war Japan. For 
our background knowledge here, however, it will suffice to say that he 
was educated in the Army College and in the Army Staff Academy in the 
first decades of this century. He then went to England as a Military 
Attache, served in various positions with the Army troops stationed 
in Korea and Manchuria as well as in the central offices of Tokyo, 
and was involved in the fierce battles against Kuo-Min-Tang troops 
in South China just before the outbreak of the Pacific war. He was 
said to belong to the Tosei-ha, the "Discipline Faction" of the Army. 
However, he maintained a rather strong non-, or anti-factionalist 
stand during the internal Army turmoils of the 1930s, on the principle 
that the Army should not be used as a political instrument against 
the will of the Emperor, the only morally and constitutionally legiti­
mate Supreme Commander. He was very much impressed by the strength 
of the popular support behind the Chinese nationalist troops and 
placed a much higher evaluation on the ability of China to resist 
foreign invasion (including that from Japan) than the so-called "China- 
experts" in the Army did:
More than ten officers from the Army had been sent to 
China annually as military attaches. Thus in the past 
fifty years several hundred "China experts" were created.
I knew personally some fifty members of the total group 
but they were more or less of the same opinion that the 
defeat of China by the western powers as well as Japan 
was caused by the defeatist ideology of 'mei-fa-tu' [can 
not help]. However, from my experience in Manchuria and 
China, I would rather maintain that the ideology strength­
ens the persistent resistance of the Chinese people by 
preventing them from desperation and self-destructive 
tendencies.2 3
In early November of 1941, Imamura was recalled to Tokyo from 
China in order to command the newly formed 16th Army which had been 
assigned to attack the Dutch East Indies. In the following two 
months the Headquarters of the group, including that of the pro­
spective military administrative personnel, was located in Tokyo. 
Imamura led his troops in the landing on Java in early March of 1942 
and set up the headquarters of the military government in Batavia 
on March 10.
During the brief military campaign on Java, which ended with 
the unconditional surrender of the Allied forces, Imamura had come 
into contact with the Indonesian population for the first time. He 
was surprised by the enthusiastic welcome of the people. He writes:
"I became convinced from the second day of the landing that the 
Indonesian and Japanese are certainly people of the same race and 
common stock. If not, how was it possible for them to show so much 
goodwill and cooperation to the Japanese troops!"21* This conviction 
was widely shared among the Japanese in Indonesia and had a signifi­
cant effect on the policies of the military administration.23 45
23. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 11.
24. Ibid., p. 148.
25. For similar statements, see: Miyamoto, Jawa shusen, p. 3, and
Machida, Tatakau, pp. 60-61.
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The pervasiveness of this conviction on the part of the Japanese 
may be accounted for by the fact that the invading Japanese troops 
had already been psychologically prejudiced in favor of the Indo­
nesians from prior propaganda in Japan. In the 1930s a group of 
anthropologists in Japan had supported a theory, based on the common 
occurrence of some physical and cultural traits among Japanese 
and Malayo-Polynesian peoples, that considerable numbers of the 
prehistoric ancestors of the Japanese must have migrated to Japan 
from the south on the Black tides. The military adopted this theory, 
and with the' collaboration of some anthropologists, such as Masao 
Oka and Kenji Kiyono, elaborated it into official propaganda at 
home and abroad.
The goal of the occupation of Java was phrased as the "rebirth 
of a Ja£an" in the South,ancient homeland of the Japanese.26 The 
current "backwardness" of the "brothers in the South" was explained 
by the Dutch colonial policy of keeping them ignorant for three 
hundred years; henceforth, education and enlightenment by the 
Japanese should provide the means to cultivate potentialities 
similar to those found among the Japanese.27 The feeling was 
created that this was a reunion of a long-separated fartiily, and 
it prevailed, at least among the Japanese, until the later period 
of the Occupation when military authorities shifted the propaganda 
line to the encouragement of nationalist sentiments. At the same 
time, the Japanese felt a sense of indebtedness to the Indonesians 
for their cooperation in winning the battles against the Dutch 
and this indebtedness had a lasting effect in shaping further 
occupation policies. For example, Imamura rejected the harsher 
occupation policies suggested by Singapore and Tokyo on the 
grounds that the 16th Army could not betray the goodwill of the 
Indonesians whose cooperation had supplied him half of the power 
which he used in his victory over the Dutch.28
Criticism of Imamura's "Soft-line" Policies
The early policies of Imamura were strongly criticised by 
some of the military, especially from outside Java. It may seem 
strange to learn that his actions were considered "too mild." since 
a number of suppressive measures--including prohibiting any politi­
cal activities or organizations, banning the use of the Red and 
White flag and the song "Indonesia Raja," as well as pressuring 
Indonesian newspapers--were taken in the early days of the Occupa­
tion in the name of Imamura. As a consequence, the aspirations 
of Indonesian nationalist leaders for the immediate independence 
of Indonesia under Japan had been flatly crushed.29 In order to 
explain this apparent discrepancy, it is necessary to know what 
the Japanese military meant by "harshness" or "mildness" in
26. Benda et^  al. , Selected Documents, p. 238.
27. Ibid.
28. Imamura, [Memoirs], p. 148.
29. Benda, "Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation," passim.
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occupation policies. Imamura devotes many pages to describing his 
own conceptions about the spectrum of opinions on this issue and 
the interactions among the various levels in the military chain of 
command.30 For the sake of the clarity I will trace below the 
series of events chronologically.
As mentioned above the principles of government to be followed 
by all military units in the occupied areas had already been decided 
by the central office of the Imperial General Headquarters, and by 
the Ministries of Army, Navy, and Foreign Affairs. But specific de­
tails and the method of implementation was mostly left to each 
individual unit, which caused differences in actual occupation policy 
among the various military groups.
In the case of the 16th Army, Imamura convened the first meet­
ing of his staff on March 10, 1942, the day when the Military Admin­
istration Headquarters was established in Batavia. Its purpose was 
to determine the principles of occupation policy for Java. According 
to Imamura, the younger members of the Staff favored beginning with 
a series of repressive measures to impress the powerfulness of Japan 
upon the population, lifting the pressures gradually later according 
to developments. Major Yasuto Nakayama, who was in charge of military 
administration, insisted on following the already established "Out­
line"31 which stipulated that administration aims should be to impress 
the people with the "virtues of the fairness and dignity of Japan" 
and to facilitate economic reconstruction in order to acquire vital 
war resources. Senior members of the Staff, such as Major Tatsuhiko 
Takashima (Chief of the Military Operations Section), Major-General 
Yoshikazu Harada (the Vice-Chief-of-Staff), and Major-General Okazaki 
(the Chief-of-Staff), agreed with Nakayama.
Imamura ended the discussion by saying that the Java military 
administration should follow the previously-established directions 
as strictly as possible. In his view, it was necessary to erase 
erroneous impressions concerning Japanese aggressiveness to show 
that the principle of Hakko-lohiu ("all worlds under one roof") 
meant not aggression but "pan-familialism." Moreover, initial 
repressive measures were unnecessary, he said,because the Army already 
possessed overwhelming force and could use it unilaterally at any 
time. Hence, the 16th Army decided to adopt a "mild" policy.32
This "mild" policy took shape in such measures as: giving
priority to immediate economic reconstruction and the reestablish­
ment of normal civilian life by utilizing Dutch expertise and 
Chinese economic organizations; reappointing and confirming the 
status of Indonesian officials; reopening Indonesian schools; and 
developing a propaganda format which emphasized friendship and cooper­
ation between the Japanese and Indonesian peoples. All this was 
swiftly implemented in the early months of the Occupation.
30. Imamura, [Memoirs], pp. 146-169, 205.
31. "Outline of Administration in Occupied Areas" [Senryochi tochi 
zantei yoko]. This was the principal policy document for the 
Army territories. Unfortunately the text has not yet been found.
32. Imamura, [Memoirs], pp. 146-147.
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The first criticism of this policy line arose from an unexpected 
source--the Japanese population in Java. A number of private Japa­
nese businessmen had spread out over the newly occupied areas on 
the heels of the invading Army.
These included two different categories: people sent by
large enterprises at the request of the military and individual 
volunteers, most of whom had had previous colonial experience. A 
journalist described the passengers on the boat he travelled to 
Singapore on in October of 1942:
There were some one thousand civilians on the 'hospital' 
boat. They were of very mixed trades. In addition to 
a team of entertainers, who were in fashion, there were 
mistresses of Japanese restaurants with geishas and 
cooks, managers of coffee-shops, welders, clock-workers, 
automobile-drivers, shamis&n [traditional Japanese 
stringed instrument] repairmen, carpenters, and wall- 
painters for Japanese-style houses, tatami [mattress] 
workers, businessmen who had firms in the South, and 
waitressess who were going to work in the military 
commissaries and in hotels.33 34
Entry into particular occupied territories by such private 
businessmen was regulated by the central offices of the Army and 
Navy,311 and often without taking into consideration the wishes of 
the local administration. In Java, the Army would not easily 
consent to the opening of private Japanese firms, especially for 
the restoration of semi-public sectors of the economy. The 16th 
Army preferred to continue using the Dutch engineers and executive 
personnel, believing that these people, having undertaken the destruc­
tion, were more capable of the reconstruction. Also Chinese and 
Dutch merchants were allowed to remain in business in order to 
avoid a sudden increase in unemployment and to continue a normal 
flow of necessary commodities. The Japanese businessmen started to 
complain about the situation on Java. This had immediate repercus­
sions in Singapore, where their colleagues were given much more free­
dom and protection by the Army, which had repressed the Chinese and 
had totally removed the British from the public scene. The Army 
in Singapore and, later, Tokyo joined in the criticism: "All white
people are free everywhere in Java. It doesn't look like an occupied 
area at all."35
The first official pressure to change Imamura's policy came 
after the arrival of three political advisors to the Java Military 
Administration in mid-April.36 They delivered suggestions from
33. Kuroda, Gunsei, p. 60.
34. Army Lt. Colonel Koji (Mitsutsugu) Takeda, Nampo no gunsei 
[Military Administration in the South] (Tokyo: Senryu-do,
1943), pp. 244-246.
35. Hitoshi Imamura, A Tapir in Prison, p. 128 (Wason Film 905, 
reel no. 5, Cornell University Library).
36. These three advisors to the Java Military Administration were 
Count Hideo Kodama (ex-Minister of Internal Affairs), Kyujiro 
Hayashi (ex-Ambassador to Brazil), and Kenichiro Kitayama (ex- 
Vice Minister of Colonial Affairs). Hayashi played a vital
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Tokyo and Singapore that the power of the occupying forces should be 
more openly displayed in Java in order to make the indigenous popula­
tion rely on and trust in Japan. Imamura disagreed. He had come to 
the conclusion that the Indonesian people were of the same race as 
the Japanese and thus no repressive measures were needed to secure 
their brotherly cooperation. Moreover, he believed that indiscrimin­
ate repression of the Dutch civilian population was against the moral 
code of the Senjinkun, 37 and that curbs on Chinese and Dutch
economic activities and organizations would surely stop the normal 
flow of goods, including war supplies. After a one-month inspection 
tour of Java, the three advisors returned to Batavia. They decided 
that Imamura was correct and that criticism of his policy stemmed 
from ignorance about the actual situation on Java. One of the ad­
visors then immediately returned to Japan via Singapore to report 
their conclusions.38 Tokyo, however, was not convinced and the 
criticism was retransmitted to Imamura through another channel.
In late April, General Hajime Sugiyama, Chief of the General 
Staff of the Army, made a trip to the South to evaluate past military 
operations and to collect information for future defense plans. He 
expressed deep satisfaction with the operation in Java but at the 
same time warned Imamura that criticism of his policy for military 
administration was widespread in Tokyo and that he, Sugiyama, had no 
direct jurisdiction since he was only responsible for general military 
operations. He warned that the critics might ruin Imamura's career. 
Imamura replied frankly that he was following officially-established 
directions, modified only by his own judgment and conscience about 
what was best suited to Java. He indicated he would have no choice 
but to resign if ordered to change his policy.39
At almost the same time as Sugiyama's visit, Imamura experienced 
pressure from another quarter, in the form of a real confrontation.
An inspection team headed by Lt. General Akira Muto, Chief of the 
Military Affairs Department of the Ministry of the Army (under whose 
jurisdiction all the military administrations of the Army-occupied
role in the later period of the Occupation in resuming the discus­
sion of the issue of the amount of independence to be allotted 
to the Indonesians.
37. The Senj inkun [Instruction on the Soldier's Conduct on the Battle­
field] was written by Imamura in 1940, while he was the Super- 
intendant of Military Education in the Army, on the request of 
Tojo, then Minister of the Army. It may be regarded as an expres­
sion of the Tosei-ha's (Discipline Faction) efforts to restore 
hierarchical order and command in the army in anticipation of a 
major war. It was phrased in a simple but beautiful neo-classical 
style. After the war Imamura regretted that the Senj inkun was 
too abstract in expression to be effective in properly sanction- 
ing individual soldiers' conduct. See: Imamura, [Memoirs], III,
pp. 111-116.
38. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 148-150. Also, Imamura, Tapir, 
p. 148.
39. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 151-152. Also, Imamura, Tapir, 
p. 130.
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areas came) arrived in Java accompanied by Tominaga, Chief of the 
Personnel Affairs Department of the same Ministry. After a short 
trip through Java, Muto and Tominaga met with Imamura, at which 
time Muto repeated the criticism and suggested that the example of 
Singapore be followed. Muto also asserted that the "Outline" decided 
upon in the early days of the war need not be followed too strictly 
now since the overall situation had changed very much in Japan's 
favor. The Army no longer needed to pay much attention to the 
sentiments o.f the native populations in order to solicit their co­
operation. What was necessary was to impress them with the power 
and authority of the Imperial Forces so they would obey the will 
of Japan; this would facilitate future military operations and 
ensure a stable supply of war goods. Before the final decision 
was made on revisions of the "Outline," the central office of the 
Ministry wanted to reach an agreement about the new policy with 
the Army groups actually in charge of the military government.40 412
Imamura was stubborn. He said that he did not know whether the 
situation had changed, because the consequence of the Occupation 
could not be judged on the basis of only a few months' experience.
If a repressive policy were undertaken, the failures in China, 
which had resulted from arousing of popular resentment, would be 
repeated in Java and then the reconstruction of the economy would 
be totally out of the question. He also told Tominaga that he 
was determined to continue his policy and that he would rather be 
removed from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army 
than to see any official revision of the policy made from the 
center. **1
While travelling in Java, Muto and Tominaga had voiced their 
criticism to various local officers. On the subject of the treat­
ment of P.O.W's, for instance, they had charged Imamura with being 
too "soft," setting an example of how to treat the P.O.W's by 
slapping the face of an Allied officer in an internment camp when 
he failed to give them a proper military greeting. Later, during 
a monthly meeting of garrison commanders, Imamura had to re­
emphasize strongly the correctness of his own policy in order to 
prevent unrest among the local military leadership. 2
The treatment of Allied P.O.W's was one aspect of the "mild­
ness" issue, although Imamura does not mention it himself.
According to Kuroda: "The P.O.W's were forced to do various kinds 
of work in Singapore, while in Java they were not. This was due 
to the policy of the first Commander-in-Chief General Imamura. . . . 
On April 29, 1942, a routine conference of the Bureau and Depart­
ment Chiefs of the Ministry of the Army under the chairmanship of 
the Prime Minister and Minister of the Army Hideki Tojo was convened. 
The most important agendum at this meeting was the treatment of 
the P.O.W's in the South . . . then about one hundred thousand in
40. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 153-155; and Tapir, pp. 129-130.
41. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 154-155; and Tapir, pp. 129-130.
42. Ibid.
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all." Lt. General Mikio Murakami, Chief of the Bureau of P.O.W's, 
insisted on honoring the stipulations of the Geneva and the Hague 
Treaties. Tojo, however, dismissed this on the grounds that the 
"war in Greater Asia" was a war for the liberation of Asia and was 
racial in nature. In order to demonstrate the superiority of the 
Japanese people to the whites, the P.O.W's were to be used in China, 
Korea, and Manchuria; they were to engage in manual labor before the 
public. "The conference decided to adopt Tojo's line, but Imamura 
ignored this and continued to honor the international treaties ."lt 3 
Since Muto and Tominaga visited Java right after Tojo's decision, 
their confrontation with Imamura was not so much a matter of a dif­
ference in opinions (which is the way Imamura describes it) as it 
was the latter's rejection of an order decided upon at a higher level 
of the military bureaucracy. Imamura maintained his own policy.
In late May, the news of changes in Tokyo attitudes reached 
Imamura when the Chief of the Military Hardware Department of the 
Ministry of the Army visited Java. He informed Imamura that Muto 
and Tominaga had not recommended that Tojo replace him. Rather, 
they suggested a delay until the overall achievements of the 16th 
Army's military administration could be assessed, implying that it 
was natural for differences to occur between Singapore and Djakarta 
because of variations in the ethnic composition of the populations 
concerned. Tojo agreed and decided not to interfere with Java for 
the time being.1*1'
The attitudes among the personnel on the intermediate levels 
were also changing. When Count Marshal Terauchi, General Commander- 
in-Chief of the Southern Area Army Corps in Singapore, visited Java 
in June as the head of an inspection team, he briefly told Imamura 
that he had no comment on the military operations, defense plans, 
and military administration of the 16th Army other than that they 
were all proceeding satisfactorily. This was something Imamura 
had not expected to hear from Terauchi, for he knew that Terauchi 
had concurred with criticism about the "mildness" of military admin­
istration policy in Java. However, Major Akiho Ishii, who accom­
panied Terauchi, told Imamura that Terauchi had changed his previous 
view as a result of his trip to Java. Ishii related that he himself 
had drafted the "Outline" of military administration while he had 
been in the office of the Military Affairs Department of the Ministry 
of the Army. After he was transferred to the General Headquarters 
of the Southern Area Corps, he had insisted on observing the "Out­
line" as strictly as possible although very few listened to his 
opinion. They maintained that the situation had changed drastically. 
However, through this inspection trip, Ishii continued, Terauchi was 
deeply impressed by the situation on Java and had even become in­
clined to regard Imamura's policy as a model for military adminis­
tration elsewhere. Ishii appreciated Imamura's efforts to adhere 
to the original "Outline" and asked him not to abandon the current 
policy in Java.1*5 Imamura was much encouraged by Terauchi's words 
and Ishii's information. At the official level, at least, the 
criticism of Imamura subsided. However, the Kempeitai reported to 435
43. Kuroda, Gunsei, pp. 95-97.
44. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 155; and Tapir, p. 131.
45. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 159; and Tapir, p. 132.
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Imamura that among the officers and civilians staying at the Hotel 
Des Indes, which was used to accommodate visitors from outside Java, 
criticism of the "soft-line" of the 16th Army was still being openly 
voiced.* 6
In July, while the top military leaders of the 16th Army were 
still at odds with Singapore and Tokyo, a disturbing incident 
occurred. Ir. Sukarno, who had just returned from Sumatra, was 
beaten by a. Japanese officer, and Imamura and Nakayama feared that 
the officer might have been motivated by anger against the "mild" 
policy of the leadership. It turned out, however, that the officer, 
without knowing who Sukarno was, had been personally "reprimanding" 
him for violation of the civil defense rules concerning air-raids 
and had gotten too wild because of intoxication. Moreover, he was 
not an officer connected with the administrative unit but was under 
the Logistics Department. The officer, now sober, realized how 
serious the consequences of his conduct could be, and he had 
apologized to Sukarno. Imamura, who was relieved that a potential­
ly serious incident had been avoided, joined with a personal 
apology to Sukarno. Imamura believed that beatings, which had 
been a vicious habit in the Army for more than thirty years, should 
be strictly forbidden, especially in dealing with Indonesian wrong­
doers. He asked Sukarno to report to him any other similar 
occurrences.1*7 Imamura was generally successful in keeping his 
staff and officers obedient to this policy.
In June two significant events occurred outside Java. First, 
the Imperial General Headquarters (Daihonei) decided to take a 
generally defensive posture in the newly occupied territories in 
the South in preparation for new military operations on both the 
eastern and western fringes of these areas. 8 As a direct con­
sequence, the number of troops on Java was drastically reduced 
from 50,000 to 15,000, of which only 8,500 (two brigades) were 
combat units.1*9 Second was the establishment in June of 1942 
in Singapore of the General Headquarters of the Military Adminis­
tration for the Southern Areas. This new headquarters was expected 
to plan and execute well-coordinated regional policies regarding 
military economy, administration of civilian populations, and 
transportation and communication systems.46 78950 As a consequence,pres­
sure was exerted on Java to follow policies bringing a regional 
uniformity.
The reduction in troop size had direct repercussions on security 
measures concerning the Allied civilian nationals in Java who were 
thought to be potentially dangerous. They were not openly hostile 
to Japan for they no longer considered any significant organized 
hostility feasible. But they were regarded as a potential source 
of unrest in that their conspicuous presence tended to irritate 
the sensibilities of the Indonesian population. In order to
46. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 160.
47. Ibid. For the incident as viewed by Soekarno, see: Sukarno,
An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis! Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1965).
48. See: Hattori, Daitoa-senso, II, pp. 167-168.
49. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 150; Tapir, p. 132. Also Miyamoto, 
Jawa shusen, p. 17.
50. Hattori, Daitoa-senso, II, p. 174.
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maintain public order, then, the old colonial rulers and the ruled 
had to be separated. In order to make them economically self- 
sufficient and to prevent them from becoming a financial burden on 
the military government, these Allied nationals were expected to 
produce their own foodstuffs. To prevent espionage, it was consider­
ed advisable to keep them under the direct and constant surveillance 
of the military. To achieve these aims with a minimum of troops, the 
only solution possible was to concentrate them in restricted resi­
dential areas and relocation camps, preferably in rural areas which 
had available farm land. In his memoirs, Imamura emphasizes the 
humanitarian motivations behind this measure as well as the neces­
sity for these precautions in wartime.51 Because this policy reduced 
the number of Dutch nationals visible on the public scene, it helped 
neutralize some of the criticism against Imamura.
The new General Headquarters in Singapore soon began to demand 
uniformity in policy throughout the region, especially in the field of 
economics. At a meeting of the area Commanders-in-Chief, called by 
the new Headquarters in July of 1942, Imamura demanded the revoca­
tion of two of its directives--one concerning the reopening of 
elementary schools and the other on the establishment of a uniform 
sale price for petroleum products. The Vice-Chief-of-Staff for the 
Southern Areas Headquarters had previously suggested to Imamura that 
his emphasis on education for the native population in Java might 
have dangerous consequences by tending to encourage aspirations for 
independence. Imamura asked Terauchi, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Southern Area Corps, whether this was the official attitude of the 
Headquarters. Terauchi replied that it was not, and stated that he 
agreed with Imamura's policy for the immediate reconstruction of 
native educational systems. Terauchi said the criticism was only a 
matter of personal opinion. Imamura also demanded relaxation of 
uniform price controls on petroleum products since the Java Military 
Administration had already reduced the prices to half of those of 
the Dutch period. He maintained application of uniform prices, which 
would be twice as much as those of the pre-war period and four times 
above the current prices, would make the native population highly 
distrustful of Japan's economic policy. Terauchi was surprised by 
this and ordered an immediate revision of the price policy.52
The contrasts between the 16th Army and the 25th Army (Malaya 
and Sumatra) now became so obvious to the local populations that 
the 25th Army became annoyed because popular criticism termed the 
occupation policies on Malaya unreasonably harsh. However, Terauchi 
and the Southern Areas Headquarters were no longer pursuing a uniform 
occupation policy for the area so long as regional coordination was 
achieved in the acquisition of war supplies through a well-functioning 
transportation system. Because of this situation, the 25th Army pro­
posed bilateral negotiations with the 16th Army in order to work out 
"a middle-of-the-way" policy between the two. Imamura, however, 
turned down the proposal on the grounds that he had nothing to con­
cede.53 Thus the regional differences in occupation policy continued 
unchecked.
51. Imamura, Tapir, p. 132.
52. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 163-165.
53. Ibid., pp. 165-166.
19
In October, the final word was issued from Tokyo about the 
"mildness" of Imamura's policy. In that month Major-General 
Okazaki, Chief of Staff of the 16th Army, was ordered to report 
to Tokyo immediately. There he was notified that the 16th Army's 
achievements in the past six months were by far the best of the 
occupied areas in terms of pacification, economic reconstruction 
and war supplies, and therefore there was no need to change the 
Java policy. The military administrative personnel of Java were 
much encouraged by this judgment and determined to continue the 
"mild" policy.5*
In November, Imamura was suddenly ordered to assume a new 
position in the 8th Area Corps which was to be deployed in New 
Guinea to prevent American counterattacks. This unexpected trans­
fer of Imamura caused rumors that he was being dismissed as Commander- 
in-Chief of Java because of his policies. However, Imamura states 
in his memoirs that the appointment was made very hastily to check 
the unexpectedly early counterattacks by the U.S. in the area, and 
was not a political maneuver designed to reprimand him.54 5 While on 
a quick trip back to Tokyo, Imamura stopped over in Singapore to 
see Terauchi. Imamura asked him, among other things, to prevent 
any attempts to change the Java policy by taking advantage of his 
replacement, a request which Terauchi promised to honor. 6
Relations With Indonesian Leaders
Sukarno had returned to Djakarta in early July of 1942, only 
four months before Imamura left. Despite the short period, however, 
the two men came to know and make deep impressions on each other. 
Since contacts with Indonesian leaders were all dealt with by 
Major Nakayama,57 it is most likely that Sukarno was the only 
prominent Indonesian with whom Imamura personally became acquainted. 
According to Imamura, Sukarno's return to Java was explicitly de­
cided upon and arranged by the 16th Army Headquarters. While his 
whereabouts were still unknown, the Military Administration had 
received many letters from Indonesian youths and student groups 
requesting the Army to find him and allow him to return to Java. 
Eventually he was discovered to be under the protection of the 
Japanese troops in Sumatra. The Sendenbu of the 16th Army favored 
his return to Java because his cooperation would be advantageous 
to the Military Administration. Imamura accepted this view in spite 
of the cynical and critical attitude of Singapore that Imamura's 
troops would eventually be troubled by this enthusiastic advocate 
of independence.58
54. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
55. Ibid. , pp. 168-169. Also cf. Hattori, Daitoa-senso, II, p. 209.
56. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 205.
57. Ibid., p. 160.
58 . Ibid., p . 182.
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The first meeting of Imamura and Sukarno took place at Sukarno's 
request shortly after his return. The informal meeting was attended 
by only two other people, Major Nakayama and Imamura's personal inter­
preter, a 16-year-old Indonesian-born Japanese. Imamura started the 
meeting by stating that he was well acquainted with Sukarno's career 
and prominent position in the Indonesian nationalist movement, and 
that he had no intention of coercing Sukarno into any kind of action 
against his will. Imamura, furthermore, made it clear that he had 
no authority to discuss the issue of the political status of Indonesia 
with Sukarno,since the matter had to be negotiated directly between 
Indonesian leaders and the Japanese government; he pointed out that 
the Java Military Administration could only promise that it would 
endeavor to improve the people's welfare. Sukarno could either co- 
operatq with the Military Administration or remain a neutral observer. 
In either case, Imamura promised, the Army would do its best to pro­
tect his life, property and honor. Sukarno was warned that criticism 
or action against the Military Administration would not be tolerated 
and that his freedom would be restricted although he would not be 
jailed as in the Dutch period. Imamura then suggested that Sukarno 
reply after he discussed the matter with his colleagues.
A few days later, Sukarno informed Imamura that he would cooper­
ate with the Military Administration because of its promise to better 
the conditions of the Indonesian people but that he would not let this 
restrict his freedom of action after the war. Sukarno and Nakayama 
then worked together to create an organization for implementing co­
operation between the nationalist leaders and the Army. Imamura 
kept in close contact with Sukarno through this organization.59
On the later occasion, Imamura discussed two proposals with 
Sukarno. The first concerned the appointment of Indonesian civil 
servants. Imamura noted that the home government had decided to 
send out considerable numbers of Japanese civil servants to staff 
administrative positions in residencies, regencies, and large 
municipalities. The decision, based on military considerations, 
was aimed at coordinating the administration and the military in 
expectation of defense operations and was intended to apply to all 
the occupied areas.60 Imamura said he would employ as many 
Indonesians as possible below the regency level as part of his policy 
to further the welfare of the Indonesian people. The second proposal 
concerned the Military Administration's wish to establish an organi­
zation through which the voice of the Indonesian people could be 
channeled to the Administration. Because of the wartime situation
59. Ibid. , pp. 185-187 .
60. There seemed to be another reason for sending a large number of
Imperial civil servants abroad, that is, reducing the size of the 
civil service at home to "rationalize" the Imperial bureaucracy. 
By the end of 1942, all together about 25,000 civil servants 
apparently received overseas appointments in the South. For the 
figures, see: Mantetsu Toakeizai Chosa-kai [Southern Manchuria
Railway Company Asian Economic Research Bureau], Nampo seisaku 
gaiyo [Overview of the Southern Policies], (Tokyo: mimeo., 1943), 
pp. 245-246 and pp. 248-249.
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establishment of a parliamentary-type organization was impossible.
A substitute suggestion proposed establishing a body of advisors 
consisting of a score of top Indonesian leaders. Sukarno agreed 
with Imamura's two-point proposal and within a month the Gyosei- 
shijun-in (Administration Advisory Body) was established; this 
body had convened for three or four sessions before Imamura left 
Dj akarta.61
Imamura describes Sukarno's personality as gentle and elegant, 
a man who spoke quietly but revealed himself to be a man of strong 
will and dedication to his cause.62 Imamura obviously liked and 
respected Sukarno who returned the sentiments.63 64 Acquaintance with 
Imamura must have been one of the major reasons for Sukarno's trust 
in Japan and her military elites through the final period of the 
Occupation. As a measure of his respect for Imamura, in 1946 
Sukarno reportedly ordered the Republican troops to rescue Imamura 
from the Dutch jail if he were sentenced to death.61*
Views on the War in General
By May of 1942 most of the former colonies in Southeast Asia had 
been "liberated" by Japan. At this stage, Imamura believed that the 
War would soon be over with favorable results for Japan. He definite­
ly opposed expanding the battle front beyond Burma to the west or 
Indonesia to the east. As far as the areas within these two front­
lines were concerned, he thought that the Japanese armed forces were 
capable of effectively preventing the Allied counter-offensives and 
bringing the war to a victorious conclusion. Hence, when General 
Sugiyama, General Chief-of-Staff, came to Java in 1942, Imamura 
strongly protested the inclination among the military leaders in 
Tokyo to expand the battlefronts before firmly stabilizing areas 
already occupied. He especially criticized the order removing two- 
thirds of his original troops from Java to the east. He asked 
Sugiyama why the Army Staff Headquarters had changed the original 
strategic task of the 16th Army, implied by its code-name "Osamu," 
which meant "to settle" or "to restrain" the war by its occupation 
of the main parts of the Dutch Indies.65 Sugiyama replied that the
61. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 188-189. No other information is 
available on this organization. However, this certainly seems 
to have been a predecessor of the Chuo-sangiin (Central Advisory 
Council) and the Sanyo-kaigi (Body of Advisors).
62. Ibid., p . 183.
63. Adams, Sukarno  ^ p.  175.
64. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 191-194.
65. I can find no other sources which indicate that the strategic 
tasks of the Army groups in the South were implied by their code- 
names. However, as to the literal meanings, "Nada" (Army in 
North Borneo) means "straits" which might be a proper geographical 
characterization and "Tomi" (25th Army in Sumatra) has a meaning 
of "wealth" which might have implied the task of extracting 
natural resources there.
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task had not been changed but that the necessity for new operations 
had arisen in the fringe areas.66
Many of the top military personnel shared with Imamura this 
rosy perspective on the war. But two contrasting conclusions about 
future policy for the newly-occupied areas were drawn from this 
perspective. One was to "colonize" these areas following previous 
Western patterns: territorial incorporation ; administration by
Japanese personnel; colonization by the Japanese civilian popula­
tion as the-ruling class; and "Japanization" in culture, especially 
by education. The other conclusion was to regard the indigenous 
population as capable of eventual political independence after the 
wider participation and training of indigenous leaders in adminis­
tration, and by measures to insure the future friendly cooperation 
of these countries in a Greater Commonwealth of Japan. As was 
briefly mentioned in the introduction, however, the two alterna­
tives were limited by pre-existing factors and Japan had to pursue 
the second course elsewhere than in Indonesia. In Indonesia itself 
the two conclusions were sharply debated.
Imamura definitely advocated the second viewpoint. He had 
told Sukarno that he could not decide the issue of independence, 
but that did not mean that he had no opinions on the problem, al­
though we have no explicit explanation of ideas other than those 
scattered among what has been presented above. If speculation is 
allowed here, however, I wish to present an important document 
which has no personal name or definite date to indicate by whom 
and when it was written other than the vaguely anonymous designa­
tion "Headquarters of Osamu Group."67 It was apparently written 
as a report on the opinion of the Osamu Group Headquarters about 
the future political status of Indonesia, and was sent to the 
central authorities in Japan. The contents of the document suggest 
that it was written during the very early period of the Occupation, 
before Allied counterattacks and the resultant economic hardships 
on the Indonesian population had made themselves felt. The brief 
but clear-cut sentence structure and straightforward logic of the 
argument have almost convinced me that the writer was no other than 
Imamura.
Even if the hypothesis about authorship is incorrect, the docu 
ment undoubtedly was written by one of highest military leaders 
of the 16th Army and before February, 1943. Two clues, admittedly 
small, seem to support this dating of the document. One is the 
seal and the other the numbers, both found on the front page of 
the original mimeographed booklet. The name on the seal is read 
as "Nakayama" which undoubtedly means the booklet was once in the 
possession of Colonel Yasuto Nakayama, a member of the Central
66. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, p. 150.
67. For the Japanese text of this document, see Nishijima et al., 
Indoneshia, pp. 559-561. For an English translation, see 
Benda et al., Selected Documents, pp. 237-239. The Cornell 
University Library has a microfilmed copy of the original 
document (Wason Film 905, reel no. 1).
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Staff of the 16th Army and the Chief of the General Affairs Depart­
ment of the Military Administration until February 1943 (when he was 
replaced by Colonel Moichiro Yamamoto). This suggests that the docu­
ment was produced not later than that date. The second clue reads 
"number three of five copies" which seems to be the serial number of 
this top secret document. It seems reasonable to assume that only 
five copies of this document were produced. However many of the above 
conjectures are untrue, it still seems certain that the document was 
drafted by one of the top military leaders of the 16th Army and cir­
culated among a very limited number of policy-makers in the field 
and in Tokyo. The document is thus one of the most important sources 
available from which to learn the position of Imamura and his immedi­
ate subordinates with regard to the issue of independence.
The report requests that the central authorities, on the earliest 
possible occasion, officially declare their intention of granting high 
level autonomy to Indonesia. It advocated this goal on two grounds: 
first, "a common ideality under the name of 'Indonesia'" combined 
with considerable high achievements in traditional culture were suf­
ficient to create a politically autonomous entity; and second, the 
difficulties of full independence in the context of fierce interna­
tional power politics and the inevitability of regional bloc formation 
were well-recognized among the nationalist leaders. The report 
demanded the immediate declaration of this goal while the Indonesian 
people's appreciation for the Japanese defeat and removal of the 
previous colonial masters was still high and the hardships of the 
war economy were still slight. If Japan delayed this declaration 
until the Allies began counterattacking, the report argued, Japan 
would lose the basis of its moral stand which would create a feeling 
of contempt among the Indonesians towards the Japanese. The report 
concluded with the serious warning that Japan's continuous failure 
in China and "the same bitter cup suffered by the former Dutch regime 
at the time of its collapse" would unavoidably be repeated in 
Indonesia, if Japan set inadequate goals or erred in its timing in 
this matter.
We have no first-hand information about how Tokyo responded to 
this report. The response can only be conjectured from the follow­
ing events. In January of 1943, at a speech to the 81st Session of 
the Imperial Diet, Premier Tojo hinted at Tokyo's intentions concern­
ing the future status of Indonesia by the very fact that he did not 
mention the issue at all.68 In May of 1943, when basic policies 
towards Asian countries were discussed and decided at the joint 
meeting of the highest level leaders of the Cabinet and the General 
Imperial Headquarters in the presence of the Emperor, it was estab­
lished that Java was to be allowed some degree of participation in 
its own administration. This formally ended the discussion of the 
issue of Indonesian independence for at least a year.69 The decision, 
which resembled Imamura's report in allowing participation in admin­
istration, was actually a rejection of Imamura's ideas. In his view,
68. For the text and the background of the speech, see: Sambo-Hombu
[Army General Staff Headquarters], ed., Sugiyama Memo--Daihonei. 
Seifu renraku-kaigi to hikki [Notes by Sugiyama--Records of the 
Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Govern­
ment] (Tokyo: Hara-shobo, 1967), II, pp. 348-355.
69. Cf. Benda £t £l., Selected Documents, p. 240.
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participation was only a means to an end (political autonomy), but 
the May 1943 decision set no goals and participation was con­
ceived as nothing more than a device to elicit more cooperation 
from the Indonesian people without promise of future reward. It 
seems likely that if Imamura had continued his commandership of 
the 16th Army, he would have eventually come into more serious 
conflict with the home government than that which he had already 
experienced.
A few things about Imamura's personal ethics and moral standards 
should be mentioned. He was a traditional "samurai" whose ethics 
are represented by the common Japanese proverbs which he himself 
often quoted. One such is: "The strong should never show arrogance
before the weak." When Batavia fell to the Japanese, Imamura 
did not" allow the main body of his troops to enter the city until 
the Military Administration had established order, and he also 
decided not to hold the usual march-in ceremony by the victorious 
troops. His reasons were based on his ethical convictions.70 
Another of his favorite proverbs was: "The warrior should be
frugal in the midst of affluence." As an expression of adherence 
to this code, Imamura refused to live in the official residence 
of the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia, but instead preferred 
a more humble residence.
In Java where the Dutch and Chinese had been flaunting their 
wealth before the impoverished Indonesians, he felt that the 
Japanese occupation troops could easily be corrupted as new mas­
ters. He eventually conceded to the argument of his subordinates 
that he ought to reside in the official residence for the dignity 
of the Japanese Army. Nevertheless, he never agreed to use the 
luxurious palace-type residence of the former Governor-General 
in Bogor (Buitenzorg).71
The basis of his moral standards rested in the Emperor and 
the constitution of Japan, from which came his sense of "calling" 
as a warrior to defend his Fatherland. He believed in Japan.
He was born to be a patriot as was his generation. Imamura spent 
his teens in the middle of the Meiji era (1868-1912). For his 
generation, things Japanese were taken for granted and the tradi­
tional values were only to be supplemented by modern western tech­
nology. He had no problem of national identity. Imamura favored 
the teaching of Japanese language and songs to Indonesian children, 
although at the same time he paid due consideration to the teach­
ing of the Indonesian language and the encouragement of national 
culture. He was, for instance, much delighted with Indonesian 
children singing Japanese songs when he visited a school run by 
the Sendenbu.72 Furthermore he suggested that the Sendenbu hold 
a contest for a new song of Japanese-Indonesian friendship to be 
sung by both Japanese and Indonesians on ceremonial occasions.73
70. Imamura, [Memoirs], II, pp. 136-137.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. , pp. 172-173.
73. Ibid., pp. 196-200. See also: I.J.Brugmans et^  al., eds., 
Nederlandsch-Indib onder Japanse Bezetting, Gegevens en 
Documenten over de jaren 194 2-19 4!!) (Amsterdam: i960) , pp. 484-
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He seemed to have had no doubts about the necessity of Japanization 
nor felt anything excessive in it.
It is no wonder that the early period of the military adminis­
tration of Java under Imamura was characterized by swiftness, 
decisiveness, and pervasiveness.711 However, if we regard this as 
an expression of Japan's intention to make Java "a Japanese colony 
pure and simple,"74 5 we will be mistaken. The matter was by no means 
so simple or so pure, as we have seen. Above all, we have seen the 
impossibility of positing such a monolithic entity as "Japan's 
intention." Decisions made by the central offices could easily be 
modified by top military leaders in the field. And in the case of 
Java, Imamura's intention was certainly not colonization but, in its 
own way, was something quite the opposite. We know very little about 
how Imalnura's successor behaved and thought. Evidence suggests that 
the leaders of the 16th Army retained more or less the same attitude 
toward the political status of Java as we have outlined above for 
Imamura.76 However, Imamura's successors apparently lacked his 
articulated perspective, his sense of timing, his determination (and 
readiness) to sacrifice position and self for the benefit of Japan.
Because of his early departure from Java, Imamura managed to 
escape being identified with many of the "wrong-doings" committed 
by his successors. At the same time,however, the account of the 
journalist, Kuroda, who visited Java from November 1942 to January 
1943, indicates that Imamura's account may have been somewhat em­
bellished and that things had already begun to deteriorate.
On the surface Java was affluent in low-priced goods and 
certainly was a paradise in the occupied areas. However, 
in fact, this was nothing but a paradise built on sand.
The symptoms of inflation were already visible but no 
remedy had yet been taken. The hotel [Des Indes] where I 
stayed was said to be the best in Java, and the luxurious 
accommodations and food this hotel offered made me almost 
forget that I was living in an occupied area from which 
the battlefronts were not far away. Whenever I was fed up 
with the rich western dishes in the hotel, I could easily 
step out to find, a few feet away, superb sukiyaki and 
sushi restaurants run by Japanese on the main street of 
Koningsplein. However, since rice was the main staple for 
the indigenous people, too, Java's self-sufficiency was 
impossible; a huge quantity of rice had to be imported from 
Malaya, whereas in Malaya itself rice fields were being 
changed over to the cultivation of rubber trees. Thus, no 
optimism should have been allowed concerning the future 
supply of rice. The supply of clothes was also solely 
dependent on the stocks in Java and there was little hope 
of fresh imports from Japan. However, no definite plan 
had ever been worked out here either. In short, the 
affluence and prosperity [of Java] were only maintained 
on a day-to-day basis. . . . Major Nakayama, the Chief
74. Cf. Benda, "Beginnings."
75. Ibid., p . 551.
76. Cf. Benda et al., Selected Documents, p. 243.
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of the General Affairs Department, told me proudly 
that the trains were running regularly on schedule, 
that the normal supply of electricity was maintained 
to light every lamp, and that Java had, in this respect, 
best achieved economic reconstruction of all the oc­
cupied areas. However, [he failed to mention that] 
there had not been much destruction in Java from the 
outset. Furthermore, the points Major Nakayama made 
were of rather secondary significance in the occupied 
areas' while the war was still going on. Instead, the 
fundamental problem was how to utilize the resources 
at hand for immediate war demands and how to maintain 
the stability of the economy in spite of this. That 
the trains were running regularly and every lamp was 
lit did not mean the availability of sufficient stocks 
for replacement, nor was there any guarantee of the 
continuous functioning of these facilities in case of 
damage or trouble. Here I recognized a unmistakable 
lowering in morale among the military leaders on the 
spot, due to their overestimation of the military 
successes achieved in the initial period of the war.
. . . Java was said to be enjoying the best peace
and order in the occupied areas. Certainly security 
and safety prevailed there except for those places 
where the Japanese were present. They were the 
trouble-makers, since they were quick to be intoxi­
cated and quick to quarrel. Japanese soldiers were 
even worse,since they became arrogant. . . . Thus, 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was turn­
ing into a Co-Poverty Sphere and the hearts of the 
indigenous people were rapidly turning against 
Japan.77
77. Kuroda, Gunsei, pp. 82-83, 219.
